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ABSTRACT 
 Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act requires public 
accommodations—private entities that offer goods or services to 
the public—to be accessible to individuals with disabilities. There 
is an ongoing debate about whether Title III applies to websites 
that offer services to the public, but this debate may be resolved 
in the coming years by litigation or Department of Justice 
regulations. Assuming for the sake of argument that Title III will 
eventually be applied to websites, the next inquiry is what that 
application should look like. The regulatory definition of 
“facilities” should be amended to include nonphysical places of 
public accommodations. This change would open the door to a 
multilayered approach to accessible websites, wherein existing 
websites are subject to relatively lax requirements but new and 
altered websites are subject to stricter requirements. 
INTRODUCTION 
When Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) in 1990,1 the internet was in its infancy.2 Even so, Congress 
intended the ADA to address not only physical barriers to access but also 
communication barriers.3 Congress also intended that the ADA “keep pace 
with the rapidly advancing technology of the times.”4 As the internet has 
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1 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. (2012)). 
2 Or rather, in utero: the World Wide Web, the URL-based system which we all 
use to browse the internet, was not available until August 6, 1991. Jon Brodkin, 
First Website Ever Goes Back Online on the Open Web’s 20th Birthday, ARS 
TECHNICA (Apr. 30, 2013, 12:59 AM EDT), http://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2013/04/first-website-ever-goes-back-online-on-the-open-webs-
20th-birthday. 
3 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3), (5) (2012). 
4 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 108 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
391. 
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become pervasive, courts, policymakers, and commentators have wrestled 
with whether, and to what degree, the ADA can be applied to websites. 
For government websites, the issue is settled: they must be made 
accessible to people with disabilities.5 For privately operated websites, 
however, the debate rages on.  
To date, most cases and scholarship have dealt with the threshold 
issue—whether the ADA’s coverage of a “place of public 
accommodation”6 applies to websites at all.7 As discussed below,8 this 
issue may be settled by upcoming Department of Justice (DOJ) 
rulemaking.9 Assuming the ADA does cover websites, a more difficult 
issue arises: Under what circumstances are the burdens of making websites 
accessible too high for the ADA to require accommodation?  
The answer depends on how websites fit into the structure of ADA 
Title III, which covers privately operated public accommodations. This 
Issue Brief argues that many websites are best thought of as “facilities” 
because they offer goods and services just like physical facilities.10 The 
current DOJ regulations under Title III define “facility” to include only 
physical property,11 but this definition should be changed to include 
websites. Treating websites as facilities opens up a set of ADA obligations 
that would otherwise be inapplicable, allowing different standards to 
govern websites for existing, altered, and new facilities. Thus, website 
operators would be subject to minimal obligations for their existing 
websites, while being simultaneously required to keep accessibility in 
mind for alterations and new websites. 
Part I of this Issue Brief gives a brief history of the ADA and 
website accessibility, including the contemporary understanding of the 
ADA’s application to technology, the application of Title II of the ADA 
                                                          
5 Federal government websites must be accessible under 29 U.S.C. § 794d (2012). 
The websites of state and local governments must be accessible under Title II of 
the ADA, which applies to the “services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. See also id. § 12131(1)(A) (defining “public entity” 
to include “any State or local government”); Nondiscrimination on the Basis of 
Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and Services of State and Local 
Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,460, 43,464 
(July 26, 2010) [hereinafter ANPRM] (“There is no doubt that the Web sites of 
state and local government entities are covered by title II of the ADA.”). 
6 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 
7 For a concise discussion of the current state of the case law, see National 
Federation of the Blind v. Scribd, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 565, 568–71 (D. Vt. 2015). 
8 See infra Part I. 
9 ANPRM, supra note 5, at 43,460. 
10 See infra Part II.B. 
11 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2016). 
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to state and local government websites, and the current debate over Title 
III’s application to private websites. Part II analyzes Title III’s various 
requirements and exceptions, and it argues that websites that are places of 
public accommodation should generally be considered “facilities” under 
the ADA. This designation is critical to defining the contours of website 
accessibility, because facilities are subject to a layered set of obligations 
that are relatively light for existing facilities but more demanding for new 
and altered facilities. Part III explores the application of Title III’s 
facilities standards to website accessibility and suggests an approach that 
recognizes the relative ease with which web developers can make their 
websites accessible to people with disabilities.  
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE ADA AND WEBSITE ACCESSIBILITY 
The ADA is an intentionally broad and flexible statute. The first 
of its several overarching purposes12 is “to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities,”13 an undeniably far-reaching goal.  
This sweeping approach is apparent in the structure of the ADA. 
The ADA applies to employment,14 public services by state and local 
governments,15 and public accommodations.16 In all three contexts, the 
ADA defines “disability” to include any “physical or mental impairment 
that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”17 “[M]ajor life 
activities” are defined broadly—including a wide range of general 
activities, such as “learning,” “reading,” and “communicating.”18 Finally, 
the ADA “shall be construed in favor of broad coverage.”19 
Public accommodations—the focus of this Issue Brief—are 
similarly broadly defined. To qualify as a place of public accommodation, 
a private entity must affect commerce and fall into one of twelve broad 
categories.20 The categories of public accommodation essentially cover all 
privately owned public places that offer goods or services. For instance, 
one category covers “a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware 
                                                          
12 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012). 
13 Id. § 12101(b)(1). 
14 Id. §§ 12111–12117. 
15 Id. §§ 12131–12165. 
16 Id. §§ 12181–12189. 
17 Id. § 12102(1)(A). 
18 Id. § 12102(2). Learning, reading, and communicating are just three of eighteen 
such activities listed, but they are some of the activities most relevant to the use 
of websites. 
19 Id. § 12102(4)(A). 
20 Id. § 12181(7).  
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store, shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment.”21 The “or 
other” extension is part of each one of the twelve categories of public 
accommodations, further broadening their respective scopes to include 
similar establishments.22 
The broad scope of the ADA as applied to public 
accommodations, and their use of technology, is especially apparent from 
a report in which the House Committee on Education and Labor spent 
considerable space discussing the interaction of the ADA and 
technology.23 The report describes the ADA as “future driven”24 and 
explains that the statute, and the regulations it authorizes, was intended to 
be flexible enough to “facilitate the application of new technologies.”25  
With these principles in mind, this Part outlines the debate over 
whether websites can be considered “places of public accommodation” 
under the ADA. Part I.A examines the circuit split on this question. Part 
I.B turns to the pending DOJ rules on the issue.  
A. The Split: Are Websites “Places of Public Accommodation”? 
A Title III claim includes three elements: (1) the plaintiff must be 
“disabled,” (2) the defendant must be “a private entity that owns, leases, 
or operates a place of public accommodation,” and (3) the plaintiff must 
have been “denied public accommodations by the defendant because of 
her disability.”26 The federal circuit courts are split on whether a website—
a nonphysical place, if a place at all—is a “place of public 
accommodation” that satisfies the second element. There are essentially 
three approaches: (1) places of public accommodation need not be 
physical structures; (2) only physical structures are places of public 
accommodation; and (3) for a nonphysical place to be a place of public 
                                                          
21 Id. (emphasis added). 
22 The Supreme Court has referred to them as “extensive categories” which should 
be “construed liberally to afford people with disabilities equal access to the wide 
variety of establishments available to the nondisabled.” PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 
532 U.S. 661, 676–77 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
23 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303. 
24 Id. at 122. 
25 Id. at 119. 
26 Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12182(a)–(b) (2012)). This formulation appears to have originated in the 
Northern District of California. Dunlap v. Ass’n of Bay Area Gov’ts, 996 F. Supp. 
962, 965 (N.D. Cal. 1998). It is by no means a Ninth Circuit test alone, however—
Molski’s formulation has been cited by the Second and Eleventh Circuits as well. 
Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1333 (11th Cir. 2013); 
Camarillo v. Carrols Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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accommodation, it must have a sufficient “nexus” to a physical structure 
that is a public accommodation. 
 The First and Seventh Circuits have taken the first 
approach, holding that nonphysical facilities can be public 
accommodations.27 As Judge Posner wrote, “[A] store, hotel, restaurant, 
dentist's office, travel agency, theater, Web site, or other facility (whether 
in physical space or in electronic space) that is open to the public cannot 
exclude disabled persons from . . . using the facility in the same way that 
the nondisabled do.”28  
In contrast, the Third and Sixth Circuits have taken the second 
approach, holding that “places of public accommodation” are 
unambiguously limited to physical places.29 Although these circuits have 
not explicitly held that websites are excluded from Title III, this 
conclusion would be compelled by their holdings that a “place” of public 
accommodation must be a physical place. 
The Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have tried to navigate a 
middle ground by using a “nexus” test. The Ninth Circuit held that a 
nonphysical space could be a place of public accommodation if it had 
“some connection between the good or service complained of and an 
actual physical place,” and the Second and Eleventh Circuits have reached 
similar conclusions.30  
                                                          
27 The First Circuit moved first on this issue, holding that the provision of 
insurance benefits—a service without a physical storefront—was covered by Title 
III. Carparts Dist. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, 
Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994). District courts have applied this explicitly to 
websites. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 
(D. Mass. 2012). 
28 Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999). Judge 
Posner reiterated this holding two years later. Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., 268 
F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2001). 
29 Ford v. Schering–Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613–14 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker 
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
30 Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 
2000). The Second Circuit has reached the same conclusion. Pallozzi v. Allstate 
Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 32–33 (2d Cir. 1999). The Eleventh Circuit has 
indicated agreement as well, but has declined to decide whether websites require 
a nexus or can be public accommodations in their own right. Access Now, Inc. v. 
Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir. 2004); Rendon v. 
Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1283, 1284 n.8 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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B. The DOJ Rulemaking 
In 2010, the DOJ issued an Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (ANPRM) announcing its intent apply Title III to websites.31 
The ANPRM is just the first step in the rulemaking process, allowing the 
DOJ to collect public comments on what the rules should require before 
issuing a proposed rule.32 
Although the primary goal of the ANPRM was to invite public 
comment, the DOJ did express a few positions that illuminate its 
intentions. First, the DOJ indicated that it intends to apply Title III to 
websites that are public accommodations regardless of whether there is a 
nexus to a physical place.33 Second, the DOJ announced an intention to 
apply particular compliance standards to covered websites, while inviting 
comment on exactly what those standards should be.34 Third, the DOJ did 
not want to extend Title III to all web content, indicating that it intended 
to make an exception for content posted by third-party users.35 
The administrative rulemaking process is long, and this particular 
rulemaking has been quite protracted. As of this writing, the DOJ intends 
to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 2018, eight years after the 
ANPRM.36 This may be further pushed back because the DOJ intends to 
model its Title III rules after its yet-to-be-proposed Title II rules, which 
will govern state and local government websites.37 It is also possible that 
the rulemaking will be abandoned entirely under the new president and 
attorney general. 
If the DOJ eventually promulgates final rules on website 
accessibility under Title III, the rules will likely require at least some 
                                                          
31 ANPRM, supra note 5, at 43,460. 
32 See id. at 43,464. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 43,465. The DOJ indicated that it intended to adopt the Web Content 
Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0, level AA. For a discussion of these 
standards, see infra Part III. 
35 Id. at 43,465–66. 
36 Minh N. Vu & Kristina Launey, Justice Department Delays Web Accessibility 
Regulations For at Least Three More Years, Leaving Businesses in Turmoil, 
ADATITLEIII.COM (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.adatitleiii.com/2015/11/justice-
department-delays-web-accessibility-regulations-for-at-least-three-more-years-
leaving-businesses-in-turmoil. 
37 The comment period closed in fall 2016 for a Supplemental Advance Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, which will hopefully be followed by a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, which in turn precedes a final rule. See Nondiscrimination on the 
Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and Services of State and 
Local Government Entities, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,658, 28,658 (May 9, 2016) (setting 
an August 8, 2016 deadline for submitting comments). 
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online-only public accommodations to be accessible to individuals with 
disabilities, and they will set some standards for compliance. Ultimately, 
the promulgation of these rules or the related litigation may answer the 
question of which, if any, websites are “places of public accommodation,” 
but that only solves the first part of the puzzle. What remains to be seen, 
if Title III does indeed apply to websites, is how it can be applied and what 
that means for the owners of websites that are places of public 
accommodation. Parts II and III of this Issue Brief propose an approach 
that the DOJ should take to answer these questions. 
II. APPLYING TITLE III TO WEBSITES 
Title III provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated 
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of . . . a 
place of public accommodation.”38 The statute goes on to define 
“discrimination” to include five types of conduct, each of which contains 
an exception.39 These exceptions articulate, for each type of discriminatory 
conduct, a circumstance in which compliance is excused because the 
burden is too high.40 Part II.A outlines the various types of discrimination 
and their corresponding exceptions under Title III. Part II.B analyzes the 
application of each of these standards to websites. 
A. Types of Discrimination Under Title III 
1. Eligibility Criteria  
The first category of discrimination covers eligibility criteria that 
limit access, which are prohibited unless “necessary” to providing the 
public accommodation.41 Eligibility criteria that are “exclusive or 
segregative” are prohibited.42 Even facially neutral eligibility 
requirements constitute illegal discrimination if they unnecessarily screen 
out individuals with disabilities.43  
“Necessary” eligibility criteria are rare. Eligibility criteria that 
address safety concerns may be necessary, but they must be based on 
actual risk, such as requiring “all participants in a recreational rafting 
                                                          
38 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012). 
39 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(v). The fourth and fifth provisions are discussed 
together, in Parts II.A.4 and II.B.4 below, because they both apply only to 
facilities.  
40 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A). 
41 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i). 
42 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and 
in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544, 35,564 (July 26, 1991) (codified 
at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 (2016)). 
43 Id. 
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expedition be able to meet a necessary level of swimming proficiency.”44 
That requirement would be “necessary” because the rafting expedition 
carries a real risk of patrons falling into the water, which poses a risk of 
drowning, and the eligibility criterion of being able to swim is necessary 
to address that risk.  
2. Reasonable Modifications 
The second category of discrimination under Title III involves the 
failure to make reasonable modifications, unless “making such 
modifications would fundamentally alter” the public accommodation.45 
For instance, a museum would not be required to modify its policies to 
allow an individual with low or no vision to touch the artwork, but only if 
touching the artwork would do damage to it, because damage to artwork 
would fundamentally alter the nature of the museum.46 In other words, the 
museum could no longer offer the same services if patrons were allowed 
to touch the artwork. This provision is also the reason that a place of public 
accommodation generally cannot refuse to allow individuals to bring 
service animals into the facility.47 
Determining whether an accommodation fundamentally alters a 
good or service is an “individualized inquiry.”48 Because the inquiry is so 
contextualized, the provision of goods will often be subject to different 
expectations than the provision of services. For instance, the regulations 
indicate that a shop will not always be required to modify its inventory to 
include accessible versions of goods unless it is easy to do so.49  
 
                                                          
44 Id. 
45 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
46 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and 
in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,565. 
47 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c) (2016) (requiring places of public accommodation to 
allow service animals under most circumstances).  
48 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 688 (2001). In PGA Tour, the Supreme 
Court held that PGA Tour was required to allow an individual with a disability to 
use a golf cart because it allowed him to participate in the golf tournament, even 
though other participants were required to walk. Id. at 683, 690. This did not 
fundamentally alter the nature of the tournament because it did not give him an 
advantage; it merely allowed him to have enough stamina to participate. Id. at 
690. 
49 28 C.F.R. § 36.307. A public accommodation does not have to “alter its 
inventory to include accessible or special goods,” id. § 36.307(a), such as closed-
captioned video tapes, id. § 36.307(c), unless the public accommodation generally 
makes special orders and “the accessible or special goods can be obtained from a 
supplier with whom the public accommodation customarily does business,” id. § 
36.307(b). 
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3. Auxiliary Aids 
The third category of discrimination concerns auxiliary aids and 
services which public accommodations are required to provide unless 
doing so would fundamentally alter the good or service or would result in 
an undue burden.50 Note that this provision contains two exceptions: it 
excuses public accommodations from furnishing auxiliary aids if doing so 
would fundamentally alter the nature of the service or result in an undue 
burden.51 
“Auxiliary aids and services” are defined in both the statute and 
the regulations,52 and they are in four categories: (1) aids and services for 
making aural material accessible to individuals with hearing impairments, 
(2) aids and services for making visual material accessible to individuals 
with vision impairments, (3) “acquisition or modification of equipment or 
devices,” and (4) other similar services and actions.53 Such aids and 
services include furnishing closed captioning54 and screen readers.55  
Additionally, the auxiliary aids and services provision is limited 
to communication. A public accommodation must furnish such aids and 
services “where necessary to ensure effective communication with 
individuals with disabilities.”56 Because of this focus on communication, 
the provision only requires auxiliary aids and services where necessary to 
ensure communication of aural and visual materials.57 
The exceptions for this provision are also fact specific. The 
“fundamentally alter” standard has already been discussed above.58 
Similarly, the “undue burden” standard is highly contextual, “to be applied 
on a case-by-case basis.”59 “Undue burden” is defined in the regulations 
                                                          
50 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. § 12103(1); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b). The regulations contain several more 
examples, but the structure of the definition remains the same. 
53 42 U.S.C. § 12103(1)(A)–(D); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b)(1)–(4). 
54 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b)(1). 
55 Id. § 36.303(b)(2). 
56 Id. § 36.303(c)(1). 
57 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and 
in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544, 35,566 (July 26, 1991) (codified 
at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 (2016)). Despite that limitation, this provision is remarkable in 
its flexibility: “A public accommodation can choose among various alternatives 
as long as the result is effective communication.” Id; see also 28 C.F.R. § 
36.303(g) (codifying this availability of alternatives). 
58 See supra Part II.A.2. 
59 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and 
in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,567. 
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as “significant difficulty or expense.”60 The regulations list five factors to 
be considered when assessing whether an action is an undue burden, which 
generally focus on the costs of providing the auxiliary aid or service and 
the resources of the place of public accommodation.61 Yet case law 
applying these factors is extremely sparse, and most courts seem to decide 
whether an undue burden exists based on a general sense of fairness.62  
4. Barriers to Access in Facilities  
The final category of discrimination involves accessibility barriers 
to facilities.63 Multiple provisions set forth different standards for existing 
facilities,64 alterations to facilities,65 and new facilities.66  
A public accommodation must remove barriers to access in 
existing facilities if it is readily achievable to do so.67 If not, it must use 
alternative methods to make the goods and services available, if that is 
readily achievable.68 The DOJ regulations contain a nonexhaustive list of 
twenty-one examples of barrier removals that would be required if readily 
achievable,69 such as “installing ramps” for wheelchairs.70 Examples of 
alternative means include—but are not limited to—having an employee 
retrieve items from shelves, curbside service, or home delivery.71 The 
regulations define “readily achievable” as “easily accomplishable and able 
to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.”72 The readily 
                                                          
60 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.  
61 See id. (listing the factors).  
62 See, e.g., Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 
2002) (stating that the court did not need to decide whether there was an undue 
burden); Roberts v. KinderCare Learning Centers, Inc., 86 F.3d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 
1996) (considering the factors, but not going through them individually); 
Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1035 (6th 
Cir. 1995) (stating that a proposed accommodation was “plainly an undue burden” 
without mentioning the factors). 
63 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)–(v), 12183(1)(a)–(b) (2012). 
64 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)–(v). 
65 Id. § 12183(1)(b). 
66 Id. § 12183(1)(a). 
67 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). 
68 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v). 
69 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b) (2016). 
70 Id. § 36.304(b)(1). 
71 Id. § 36.305(b). In the case of a movie theater with a mix of accessible and 
inaccessible auditoriums, the theater must rotate the films shown in the accessible 
auditoriums so that individuals with disabilities are able to see all films. Id. § 
36.305(c). 
72 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). This carries the same five factors as the undue burden 
test. Id.; see supra note 61 and accompanying text.  
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achievable test is clearly meant to be a lower standard than the undue 
burden test.73  
The regulations make clear that the facility rules currently only 
apply to physical structures. “Facilities” are broadly defined but are 
exclusively physical places.74 The DOJ interprets “communication 
barriers” to be limited to physical barriers to communication,75 such as 
Braille signage and alarms with visual components.76 
Notably, the “readily achievable” standard applies only to existing 
facilities. New facilities must be accessible unless making them so is 
“structurally impracticable,”77 a standard that will be met “only in rare and 
unusual circumstances.”78 For instance, if a building will only be 
structurally sound if built on stilts, and that precludes certain accessibility 
features, those features are “structurally impracticable.”79 
Similarly, alterations to facilities, when made, must be accessible 
“to the maximum extent feasible,”80 a standard which only applies when 
“the nature of an existing facility makes it virtually impossible to comply” 
with accessibility standards.81 Thus, cost is largely irrelevant to 
feasibility,82 but the nature of the existing structure is—presumably, if the 
size or layout of the building precludes widening a doorway to make it 
                                                          
73 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations 
and in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544, 35,569 (July 26, 1991) 
(codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 (2016)). 
74 See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (“Facility means all or any portion of buildings, 
structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, 
walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property, including the 
site where the building, property, structure, or equipment is located.”). 
75 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and 
in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,568. 
76 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(c)(2). 
77 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1). 
78 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and 
in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,577. 
79 Id. (“A situation in which a building must be built on stilts because of its 
location in marshlands or over water is an example of one of the few situations in 
which the exception for structural impracticability would apply.”). 
80 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2). 
81 28 C.F.R. § 36.402(c). 
82 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations 
and in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,581 (“Costs are to be considered 
only when an alteration to an area containing a primary function triggers an 
additional requirement to make the path of travel to the altered area accessible.”). 
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wheelchair accessible, such an alteration would be “virtually 
impossible.”83 
Not all alterations trigger this standard, however. Covered 
alterations are those which “affect[] or could affect the usability” of the 
facility.84 “Normal maintenance,” such as painting, that does not affect 
usability does not trigger accessibility obligations.85 Although this 
limitation does exclude some minor changes to the facility, it does not 
appear to take much to “affect the usability” of the facility. According to 
the regulations, even renovating86 an area of the facility without changing 
the layout would improve its usability.87 
Finally, in addition to the regulations discussed above, the DOJ 
has also adopted extensive guidelines88 and technical standards.89 These 
standards, together with the regulations, are collectively known as the 
“2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design.”90 
B. Applying Title III to Websites 
Because the current regulations focus on examples of accessibility 
and discrimination in physical places, it is not immediately clear how the 
various standards would apply to websites. Assuming, as this Issue Brief 
does, that the ADA will eventually be applied to websites, it is necessary 
to determine how the existing regulations may apply.91 Although any of 
the standards—eligibility criteria,92 reasonable modifications,93 and 
                                                          
83 Roberts v. Royal Atl. Corp., 542 F.3d 363, 372 (2d Cir. 2008). 
84 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(2). 
85 28 C.F.R. § 36.402(b)(1). 
86 “[R]enovation” is explicitly listed as an example of a covered alteration. Id. 
87 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations 
and in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,581 (“The Department remains 
convinced that the Act requires the concept of ‘usability’ to be read broadly to 
include any change that affects the usability of the facility . . . .”). 
88 36 C.F.R. § 1191, App. B. 
89 Id. § 1191, App. D. 
90 Id. § 1191.1(a). The standards are incredibly detailed, but because they deal 
with physical structures the details are not especially relevant to this Issue Brief. 
91 Title III’s definitions of discrimination, discussed in Part II.A above, are 
couched in broad language. If, as this Issue Brief assumes, the current ADA can 
cover some private websites, at least some of the statutory definitions of 
discrimination, and their accompanying exceptions, must apply. 
92 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012). Such eligibility criteria are only 
permissible if they are “necessary.” Id. 
93 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). Reasonable modifications must be made unless doing 
so would “fundamentally alter the nature” of the public accommodation. Id. 
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auxiliary aids94—might apply in certain circumstances, this Section argues 
that websites are best thought of as facilities.95  
1. Eligibility Criteria 
First, websites may impose requirements for use that function as 
“eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with 
a disability.”96 An example of this is a CAPTCHA tool.97 A CAPTCHA is 
a web tool for verifying that a user is human, which helps to protect against 
automated spam.98 CAPTCHAs generally ask the user to type a small piece 
of obscured text, on the theory that humans can recognize the letters but 
computer programs cannot.99 Like the automated hotline in Rendon,100 
these tools have the effect of screening out users with low or no vision. 
Any user that relies on screen readers to use the web would be unable to 
get past the CAPTCHA.101 
To combat this problem, some CAPTCHAs have a sound 
function.102 But even aural CAPTCHAs can be problematic. Deaf-blind 
users, who may be using the internet through a text-to-braille screen 
reader,103 are still screened out. Screening like this may have once been 
“necessary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations being offered” on the website.104 But this 
is no longer true now that there are alternatives such as Google’s “No 
CAPTCHA reCAPTCHA,” which attempts to eliminate the need for any 
                                                          
94 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). Auxiliary aids must be furnished unless doing so 
would “fundamentally alter the nature” of the public accommodation or “result in 
an undue burden.” Id. 
95 See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)–(v), 12183(a)(1)–(2). Barriers to access in existing 
facilities must be removed if doing so is readily achievable, id. § 
12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), and if such removal is not readily achievable, the goods or 
services must be made available through alternative methods if that is readily 
achievable. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v). New facilities must be made accessible 
unless doing so is “structurally impracticable.” Id. § 12183(a)(1). Alterations to 
existing facilities, when made, must be made accessible “to the maximum extent 
feasible.” Id. § 12183(a)(2). 
96 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i). 
97 See Carnegie Mellon Univ., CAPTCHA: Telling Humans and Computers Apart 
Automatically, CAPTCHA, http://www.captcha.net (last visited Jan. 30, 2017). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 See Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002). 
101 Carnegie Mellon Univ., supra note 97. 
102 Id. In fact, the creators of CAPTCHA “strongly recommend” that all 
CAPTCHAs have a sound function. Id. 
103 Visual Disabilities: Blindness, WEBAIM, http://webaim.org/articles/visual/ 
blind (last updated Aug. 28, 2013). 
104 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
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text in the CAPTCHA at all by asking the user whether she is a robot.105 
Where the benefits of CAPTCHAs are “necessary,” they should be 
implemented in this way, which would minimize the screening-out of 
individuals with disabilities. 
2. Reasonable Modifications  
Second, website operators can fail “to make reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such 
modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with 
disabilities.”106 An example of a reasonable modification to a website 
might be the placement of hyperlinks in text. When links are offset from 
the text they refer to—such as when the title of an external article or 
another page is followed by a hyperlinked “(click here)”—a screen reader 
user generating a list of links, or a blind or keyboard-only user navigating 
by tabbing through links, will merely read “click here” instead of the title, 
leaving the user in the dark about where the link will take them.107 Users 
may be less likely to use these links if they cannot discern where the link 
will take them, diminishing the usefulness of the web page.108 
Hyperlinking the text describing the link would certainly be a “reasonable 
accommodation” that would not “fundamentally alter” the website.109 
3. Auxiliary Aids 
Third, website operators may fail to furnish auxiliary aids and 
services.110 Under the “nexus” test,111 a website itself is the auxiliary aid 
which allows individuals with disabilities to use a public 
accommodation.112 However, if websites themselves are places of public 
accommodation, the website is not auxiliary at all, meaning that the 
                                                          
105 Vinay Shet, Are You a Robot? Introducing “No CAPTCHA ReCAPTCHA,” 
GOOGLE: ONLINE SECURITY BLOG (Dec. 3, 2014), https://googleonlinesecurity. 
blogspot.com/2014/12/are-you-robot-introducing-no-captcha.html. 
106 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
107 Visual Disabilities: Blindness, supra note 103. 
108 See Jakob Nielson, Using Link Titles to Help Users Predict Where They Are 
Going, NIELSON NORMAN GROUP (Jan. 11, 1998), http://www.nngroup.com/ 
articles/using-link-titles-to-help-users-predict-where-they-are-going. Nielson 
also discusses the value of adding title text to links, which allows users, including 
those using screen readers, to receive descriptive information about the link 
without interrupting the text itself. Id. 
109 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
110 See id.  
111 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
112 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 956 
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (suggesting, without deciding, that Target.com may be an 
auxiliary aid or service). 
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auxiliary aids or services would be tools that aid individuals with 
disabilities in accessing the website.113  
Auxiliary aids could, in theory, be separate from the website, such 
as providing screen-reader software114 or providing the website’s 
information over the phone.115 These aids would be burdensome, however, 
even if they do not constitute an “undue burden.”116 Because of the 
potential expense of providing such assistance, website operators would 
understandably want to avoid these services where possible. Avoiding 
such obligations may not always be possible, of course—the auxiliary aid 
must be provided if it is necessary and if it does not result in a fundamental 
alteration or undue burden.117 
It may be easier to build the auxiliary aids and services into the 
website itself. For instance, closed captioning, which is specifically listed 
as an auxiliary aid in the regulations,118 could be provided together with 
video. Captioning is potentially burdensome,119 but tools such as speech 
recognition software are continually making it easier to implement.120  
Another example is alternative text (“alt text”) that corresponds to 
an image.121 When the image has alt text that describes information 
conveyed by the image, that alt text can be read by a screen reader, 
allowing the user to understand a part of the web page that they would 
otherwise miss.122 Adding alt text would certainly not “fundamentally alter 
                                                          
113 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
114 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b)(2) (2016). 
115 Target, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 956. 
116 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
117 Id. 
118 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b)(1). 
119 See Captions (Prerecorded), W3C: UNDERSTANDING WCAG 2.0, 
http://www.w3.org/TR/UNDERSTANDING-WCAG20/media-equiv-
captions.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2017). 
120 For instance, YouTube utilizes “automatic speech recognition” to provide 
automated captions for some user videos. YouTube Tools to Translate Your 
Content, YOUTUBE HELP, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/ 
4792576?hl=en&ref_topic=3014331 (last visted Jan. 30, 2017).  
121 Images can have “title” text and “alt” text. Title text is text that appears in a 
box when you hover your cursor over the image. Alt text, however, does not 
appear to most users unless the image fails to load. Roger Johansson, The Alt and 
Title Attributes, 456 BEREA ST. (Dec. 8, 2004), http://www.456bereastreet.com/ 
archive/200412/the_alt_and_title_attributes. 
122 H37: Using alt Attributes on img Elements, W3C: TECHNIQUES FOR 
WCAG2.0, http://www.w3.org/TR/2015/NOTE-WCAG20-TECHS-20150226/ 
H37 (last visited Jan. 30, 2017). 
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the nature” of the website,123 because it would change nothing about its 
functionality or appearance. Nor would it be an undue burden,124 at least 
in most cases; adding a single line of code to describe the image would be 
easy and inexpensive.125  
4. Websites as Facilities 
Although the above obligations may apply to websites in some 
circumstances, websites are best understood as facilities. Websites are 
easily analogized to physical places, and websites can be used in many of 
the ways that physical places of public accommodation can be used. A 
website can be a “place of exhibition or entertainment,”126 a “place of 
public gathering,”127 a “sales or rental establishment,”128 a “service 
establishment,”129 a “place of public display or collection,”130 a “place of 
recreation,”131 a “place of education,”132 or a “social service center 
establishment.”133 In each case, the website serves as a stand-in for the 
physical facility; the only significant difference between physical facilities 
and online facilities is that online facilities can offer goods and services to 
more people, more conveniently. In particular, individuals with disabilities 
                                                          
123 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2012). 
124 See id. 
125 This is especially so because the person uploading the image may not have to 
write code at all. For instance, an online news source would likely have a form 
for journalists to upload their stories and images, and it would be easy to include 
a field on that form for the alt text. In fact, the alt text for journalistic photos may 
be very similar or identical to the caption which is generally already provided.  
126 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C). Netflix is a perfect example. NETFLIX, 
https://www.netflix.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2017). 
127 Id. § 12181(7)(D). Facebook and other social networks, for example. E.g., 
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2017). 
128 Id. § 12181(7)(E). Amazon, for example. AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2017). 
129 Id. § 12181(7)(F). Expedia, for example, would be a “travel service.” EXPEDIA, 
https://www.expedia.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).  
130 Id. § 12181(7)(H). Scribd, for instance, is an online library. SCRIBD, 
https://www.scribd.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).  
131 Id. § 12181(7)(I). A website offering a game would be an example of a place 
of recreation. 
132 Id. § 12181(7)(J). Coursera, for example, offers access to online courses. 
COURSERA, https://www.coursera.org (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).  
133 Id. § 12181(7)(K). Because the statute lists food banks, homeless shelters, and 
adoption agencies, one can imagine similar services offered via websites. For 
instance, the Charities Aid Foundation of America offers a database of charities 
around the world, each with a “donate now” button. Global Database, CAF 
AMERICA, http://www.cafamerica.org/give-now/global-database (last visited Jan. 
30, 2017). 
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can use websites to access services that they would otherwise have 
difficulty getting to. 
This interpretation of “facility” is consistent with the statutory text 
of the ADA. Title III does define “commercial facilities” but only as 
“facilities” that are nonresidential and affect commerce.134 Similarly, 
“public accommodations” are private entities that affect commerce and fall 
into one of twelve categories.135 Thus, commercial facilities and places of 
public accommodation are, if not synonymous, nearly identical in 
meaning. If websites can be places of public accommodation, there is no 
statutory language to suggest they should not also be facilities. 
Admittedly, the DOJ’s Title III rules currently define “facility” as 
physical property.136 However, the same section defines a place of public 
accommodation as a facility.137 Therefore, if places of public 
accommodation include websites, then either the definition of facility must 
change or the definition of a place of public accommodation must cease to 
be limited to facilities. It makes little sense to remove “facilities” from the 
definition of places of public accommodation, because the definitions of 
“commercial facility” and “place of public accommodation” are very 
similar138 and because the provisions about different types of facilities139 
are clearly an important part of the ADA’s coverage of public 
accommodations. Thus, if some websites are public accommodations, the 
current definition of “facility” must be changed to cover websites.140 
                                                          
134 42 U.S.C. § 12181(2). 
135 See id. § 12182(7). 
136 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2016) (“Facility means all or any portion of buildings, 
structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, 
walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property, including the 
site where the building, property, structure, or equipment is located.”). 
137 Id. Unlike the statutory definition, the regulations list the twelve types of public 
accommodation under the definition of “place of public accommodation”—which 
must be a facility—and define “public accommodation” as a “private entity that 
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” Id. This 
distinction was meant to clarify that the regulations only impose obligations on 
public accommodations insofar as they are operating places of public 
accommodation or commercial facilities. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of 
Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 
35,544, 35,546–47 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 (2016)). 
138 See supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text. 
139 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)–(v), 12183; 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.304–.305, 
36.401–.402; see also supra Part II.A.4. 
140 The redefinition would likely include more than merely websites. The current 
definition lists several examples of physical property that are facilities. See 28 
C.F.R. § 36.104 (“Facility means all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, 
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This change would allow websites to use a multilayered 
framework of accessibility obligations similar to those that apply to 
physical facilities. For existing online facilities, “communication barriers 
that are structural in nature”141 can be structural features of the website that 
prevent aural or visual communication.142 For instance, a website that does 
not specify a default human language may not be read correctly by a screen 
reader because the screen reader cannot determine which set of 
pronunciation rules to use.143 The lack of a default language is a 
communication barrier because it prevents individuals with disabilities 
from reading the web page, and it is structural in nature because it is built 
into the architecture of the web page. 
Sometimes, the removal of these barriers will be readily 
achievable144 through simple changes in code. In the case of a web page 
with no default language, this is frequently as simple as adding a single 
short line of code to the page.145  
On the other hand, sometimes the removal of these barriers is not 
readily achievable.146 In those cases, it may be readily achievable to make 
                                                          
complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks, 
passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property, including the site 
where the building, property, structure, or equipment is located.”). Similarly, 
websites are only one example of online places of public accommodation. For 
instance, in the copyright context, the Ninth Circuit has called peer-to-peer file 
sharing systems “facilities.” A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 
1022 (9th Cir. 2001). Such systems work over the internet, but generally not via 
a website. See id. at 1011 (explaining that Napster, the peer-to-peer system at 
issue, allowed files to be transferred over the internet via a software client). The 
precise boundaries of the definition, however, are outside the scope of this Issue 
Brief, which is focused specifically on websites. 
141 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). 
142 The current regulations were only intended to apply to communication barriers 
“that are an integral part of the physical structure of a facility.” Nondiscrimination 
on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial 
Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,544, 35,568. However, if the definition of “facility” 
is expanded to include websites, it follows that the scope of communication 
barriers in facilities would expand as well. 
143 Language of Page, W3C: UNDERSTANDING WCAG 2.0, http://www.w3.org/ 
TR/UNDERSTANDING-WCAG20/meaning-doc-lang-id.html. 
144 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). 
145 H57: Using Language Attributes on the HTML Element, W3C: TECHNIQUES 
FOR WCAG 2.0, http://www.w3.org/TR/2015/NOTE-WCAG20-TECHS-
20150226/H57 (last visited Jan. 30, 2017) (demonstrating that, to specify in 
HTML that the default language is French, the web developer merely needs to add 
“<html lang=“fr”>”). 
146 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). 
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the goods and services available through alternative methods.147 For 
instance, JavaScript potentially presents numerous accessibility issues.148 
Pop-up windows enabled by JavaScript create difficulties for individuals 
with disabilities, and it is difficult to implement them in an accessible way: 
“If they are used, thorough user testing of your implementation is vital to 
ensure accessibility.”149 User testing is potentially not readily achievable, 
because it may require significant “difficulty or expense.”150 
The multilayered approach to websites makes sense largely 
because, as with physical facilities, it is much more burdensome to make 
an existing website accessible than it is to make a new website accessible. 
Changing a website’s code involves a substantial amount of work or 
money,151 but when a website is already being created or altered, making 
the website accessible requires relatively little additional effort.152 
The regulations for facilities of public accommodations already 
make this distinction. New websites would need to be “readily accessible 
to and usable by individuals with disabilities, except where an entity can 
demonstrate that it is structurally impracticable” to comply with regulatory 
standards.153 Similarly, alterations to a web facility “or part thereof . . . in 
a manner that affects or could affect the usability of the facility or part 
thereof” must be made readily accessible “to the maximum extent 
feasible.”154 Although cost and other burdens are important considerations 
in determining whether an existing website must be modified, they are 
largely irrelevant to the requirements for websites that are already being 
altered, and they are almost completely irrelevant for new websites. 
                                                          
147 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v). 
148 See Accessible JavaScript, WEBAIM, http://webaim.org/techniques/javascript/ 
#accessibility (last updated Oct. 24, 2013) (“Unfortunately, there is no easy fix 
that can be applied to solve all accessibility problems associated with 
JavaScript.”). 
149 Accessible JavaScript: Other Issues, WEBAIM, http://webaim.org/techniques/ 
javascript/other#popups (last updated Oct. 24, 2013). 
150 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9). 
151 Such as in the JavaScript example above. See supra notes 146–150 and 
accompanying text. 
152 See Roberts v. Royal Atlantic Corp., 542 F.3d 363, 369 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The 
more a place is altered, the easier and cheaper it becomes, in both absolute and 
relative terms, to integrate incidentally features that facilitate ADA access.”); 
Introduction to Web Accessibility, WEBAIM, http://webaim.org/intro (last 
updated Mar. 15, 2016) (“Sometimes web developers fear that it is more 
expensive and time-consuming to create accessible web sites than it is to create 
inaccessible ones. This fear is largely untrue.”). 
153 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1). 
154 Id. § 12183(a)(2). 
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Thus, treating websites as facilities allows for a layered approach 
to website accessibility, where existing websites are subject to a variety of 
limited obligations155 and new and altered websites are held to much more 
stringent standards.156 Of course, implementing a system for websites that 
is similar to the system in place for physical facilities will require 
something similar to the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design.157 
Part III considers how specific accessibility standards can be applied to 
websites under Title III. 
III. IMPLEMENTING WEBSITE ACCESSIBILITY RULES 
The similarities between websites and other places of public 
accommodation have thus far provided valuable insight into how the ADA 
should cover online-only public accommodations. Redefining “facilities” 
to include websites also opens up the possibility of specific technical 
guidelines to cover websites in much the same way that the 2010 Standards 
cover physical facilities.158 This Part turns to implementation, considering 
what standards should apply to online places of public accommodation. 
Regulations under Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act159 already 
require federal websites to be accessible.160 These regulations set out 
sixteen technical standards for websites161 and several more general, 
technology-neutral performance standards,162 which together reflect the 
need for simultaneous predictability and flexibility.163 The performance 
                                                          
155 See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A). Websites that are facilities of public accommodations 
would be subject to the facility-specific provisions, id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)–(v), 
as well as the general provisions that apply to all public accommodations, id. § 
12182(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii). 
156 See id. § 12183. 
157 See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
158 Id. 
159 29 U.S.C. § 794d (2012). 
160 36 C.F.R. §§ 1194.1, 1194.22 (2016). 
161 Id. § 1194.22(a)–(p). Although this Issue Brief is focused on websites in 
particular, the Section 508 regulations also include technical standards for 
software applications, id. § 1194.21, telecommunications products such as 
phones, id. § 1194.23, video and multimedia products, id. § 1194.24, self-
contained products, id. § 1194.25, and computers, id. § 1194.26.  
162 Id. § 1194.31.  
163 See Electronic and Information Technology Accessibility Standards, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 80,500, 80,501 (Dec. 21, 2000) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 1194 (2016)) 
(explaining that both sets of standards were included “because performance 
standards provide the regulated parties the flexibility to achieve the regulatory 
objective in a more cost-effective way” but regulations also must “be as 
descriptive as possible because procurement officials and others need to know 
when compliance with section 508 has been achieved”). 
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standards are very general, requiring covered technologies to be accessible 
in “at least one mode of operation” to individuals with disabilities related 
to vision,164 hearing,165 speech,166 and motor control.167 The technical 
standards for websites are much more specific, using language based on 
the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 1.0.168 
The Section 508 regulations, however, are far from perfect. The 
performance standards, for example, are expressly limited to the four types 
of disabilities mentioned above: vision, hearing, speech, and motor 
control.169 Such standards may be useful when applied to those disabilities, 
but individuals with other disabilities are entirely excluded.170 Because the 
technical standards are much more specific, the performance standards 
need to be flexible enough to apply general principles to all disabilities. 
The technical standards are imperfect as well, largely because of 
their reliance on WCAG 1.0. One of the major criticisms of WCAG 1.0 
was that its standards were largely untestable.171 Because the majority of 
the technical standards relied on language from WCAG 1.0 guidelines,172 
the technical standards suffer from the same problem. Additionally, 
WCAG 1.0 guidelines “quickly grew out of date” after being published in 
1999,173 and failed to account for the emerging multimedia nature of the 
                                                          
164 36 C.F.R. § 1194.31(a)–(b). 
165 Id. § 1194.31(c)–(d). 
166 Id. § 1194.31(e). 
167 Id. § 1194.31(f). 
168 See Electronic and Information Technology Accessibility Standards, 65 Fed. 
Reg. at 80,510 (explaining that the regulations do not incorporate the WCAG 1.0 
guidelines but are largely based on WCAG 1.0 language).  
169 36 C.F.R. § 1194.31. 
170 For example, cognitive disabilities are covered by the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(2) (2012), but they are left out of this list. Cognitive disabilities, although 
difficult to define, may sometimes be straightforward to accommodate. See 
Cognitive Disabilities: Design Considerations, WEBAIM, http://webaim.org/ 
articles/cognitive/design (last updated Aug. 9, 2013) (“Lengthy interactive 
processes, such as those required to purchase items online, should be kept as 
simple and brief as possible.”). 
171 Simon Harper & Yeliz Yesilada, Web Accessibility and Guidelines, in WEB 
ACCESSIBILITY: A FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH 71 (Simon Harper & Yeliz 
Yesilada eds., 2008). 
172 See Electronic and Information Technology Accessibility Standards, 65 Fed. 
Reg. at 80,510 (explaining that the regulations do not incorporate the WCAG 1.0 
guidelines but are largely based on WCAG 1.0 language). 
173 Joe Clark, To Hell with WCAG 2, A LIST APART (May 23, 2006), 
http://alistapart.com/article/tohellwithwcag2. 
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web.174 By encoding standards that are out of date and untestable, the 
technical standards fail to provide predictable criteria to ensure 
compliance that actually benefits individuals with disabilities. 
The WCAG 2.0 standards attempt to remedy these issues.175 The 
WCAG 2.0 are structured in four “layers of guidance” that progress from 
general and technology-neutral to highly specific and technical.176 First, 
the most general layer consists of four principles which apply to all content 
and all disabilities.177 Second, twelve guidelines—at least one for each 
principle—“provide the basic goals that authors should work toward in 
order to make content more accessible to users with different 
disabilities.”178 Third, each guideline contains multiple “success criteria” 
which set specific, testable criteria for determining compliance with each 
guideline.179 These criteria are each labeled with a “conformance level”—
A, AA, or AAA, with AAA being the most burdensome but also yielding 
the most accessible website. Finally, each success criterion links to a page 
of general and technology-specific techniques for achieving it.180 
The DOJ should adopt the principles, guidelines, and success 
criteria of the WCAG 2.0 because they are both predictable and flexible.181 
The broad principles are general enough to cover all web content and all 
disabilities, avoiding the problem faced by the Section 508 performance 
standards.182 The guidelines are more specific and can function similarly 
to section titles and purpose statements in statutes and regulations. This 
                                                          
174 See Joe Clark, Flash MX: Clarifying the Concept, A LIST APART (Apr. 26, 
2002), http://alistapart.com/article/flashmxclarifying. 
175 Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0, W3C, http://www.w3.org/ 
TR/WCAG20 (last visited Jan. 30, 2017). 
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181 Indeed, the DOJ asked whether it should adopt the WCAG 2.0 AA standards 
in the ANPRM. ANPRM, supra note 5, at 43,465. Additionally, the DOJ has 
favored the WCAG 2.0 AA standards in multiple settlements. See, e.g., Settlement 
Agreement Between the United States of America and Ahold U.S.A., Inc. and 
Peapod, LLC, DOJ No. 202-63-169 (Nov. 10, 2014), at 5, http://www.justice.gov/ 
file/163956/download (requiring Peapod to make its website and mobile 
applications conform to the WCAG 2.0 AA); Settlement Agreement Between the 
United States of America and EdX, Inc., DOJ No. 202-36-255 (Apr. 1, 2015), at 
6, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/ 
04/02/edx_settlement_agreement.pdf (requiring EdX, an online education 
provider, to make its website and mobile applications conform to the WCAG 2.0 
AA). 
182 36 C.F.R. § 1194.31 (2016); see supra notes 169–170 and accompanying text. 
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would be an interpretive aid that could guide both compliance and 
enforcement. Thus, the flexible principles and guidelines would apply 
broadly to protect individuals with disabilities, while simultaneously 
providing substantial guidance to developers and operators of websites. 
The success criteria provide increased predictability. These 
criteria are fairly specific, referring to particular types of content.183 They 
are organized in a way similar to statutes and regulations; for example, 
“2.3.1” refers to the first success criterion of the third guideline of the 
second principle.184 Additionally, they are phrased similarly to statutes and 
regulations, which may make it easier to incorporate them into predictable 
legal standards. This way, operators of websites, or the web developers 
they hire, would know exactly what they are required to do. 
Of course, no set of standards can be absolutely perfect, and 
WCAG 2.0 is no exception. One commentator points to several parts of 
WCAG 2.0 which need to be updated or clarified.185 For instance, the 
lowest level of conformance has no contrast requirements, meaning that 
“[w]hite text on a white background is Level A conformant.”186 Another 
commentator suggests that “the web is too fast-moving for web guidelines 
to ever be complete.”187 But WCAG 2.0 and ADA regulations can both be 
updated. The DOJ and the Web Accessibility Initiative—the organization 
that publishes the WCAG—should work together to update and improve 
the standards when necessary. 
However, not every aspect of the WCAG 2.0 should be adopted 
by the DOJ as binding law. First, the most burdensome level of 
conformance, AAA, is likely infeasible to adopt because it can be very 
difficult to implement.188 Second, the specific techniques for conformance, 
by the WCAG 2.0’s own terms, are meant to be “informative,” not 
mandatory.189 These highly specific documents, although certainly useful 
to a developer who seeks to make a website compliant, are not feasible to 
                                                          
183 See, e.g., Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.0, supra note 175 
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make mandatory. There are approximately two hundred general 
techniques, and hundreds of technology-specific techniques as well.190 
Adopting the general techniques would be unnecessarily burdensome,191 
especially because the techniques only describe how to accomplish what 
is already codified by the guidelines and success criteria. Adopting the 
technology-specific guidelines would be worse, running counter to the 
government’s policy, in other contexts, of being technology neutral.192 
Technology neutrality is especially important in this context. As 
the technology used in websites advances, new accessibility problems may 
emerge. For example, Microsoft Silverlight was first released in 2007.193 
Since then, the WCAG 2.0 techniques have been updated to include thirty-
five techniques for implementing Silverlight in conformity with the 
WCAG 2.0.194 Had the specific techniques been encoded into law before 
that point, the Silverlight techniques would have been left out, and web 
developers could have assumed that the regulations did not apply to 
Silverlight. In contrast, adopting technology-neutral guidelines and 
success criteria allows the regulations to apply to all existing technologies 
while simultaneously putting all parties on notice of the accessibility 
features that will be expected of future technologies. 
Finally, the regulations should also allow the law to embrace new 
technologies that expand access, especially in the context of automation. 
If accessibility features that would have been infeasible to manually 
implement can be automated, accessibility increases while the burdens on 
website operators decrease. For example, consider automatic transcripts 
for live audio-only content. Currently, the WCAG 2.0 deem it very 
burdensome—“Level AAA”—to require a transcript for live audio.195 
However, as speech recognition and automatic transcription technology 
improves, it will become increasingly easy to implement transcription in 
any context. Following the WCAG 2.0 would allow the DOJ to easily 
                                                          
190 Techniques for WCAG 2.0, W3C, http://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG20-TECHS 
(last updated Oct. 7, 2016). 
191 See, e.g., Clark, supra note 173 (“Since the Understanding document is more 
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memotociostechnologyneutrality.pdf (describing the federal government’s policy 
of making technology acquisitions in a technology-neutral way). 
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adopt new compliance obligations as certain accessibility features become 
easier to implement. 
CONCLUSION 
If the DOJ moves forward in updating its regulations to include 
websites as places of public accommodation, it should also consider 
incorporating layered standards into the obligations imposed on operators 
of websites. Although it is harder to retrofit accessibility onto old websites, 
adding new content in an accessible way is fairly straightforward, 
especially when guided by flexible, predictable standards like those set out 
in WCAG 2.0. This is precisely why the Title III “facility” framework is 
so useful; it allows somewhat less accessibility in existing, unchanging 
facilities but requires new or updated facilities to be inclusive. If the DOJ 
is going to interpret “place of public accommodation” to include websites, 
it should also redefine “facility” to include nonphysical facilities such as 
websites to assist in implementing standards such as the WCAG 2.0.  
